The paper examines an early case of creative accounting, and how, during British industrialization, accounting was enlisted by the manufacturers' interest to resist demands, led by the 'Ten hours' movement, for limiting the working day. In contrast to much of the prior literature, which argues that entrepreneurs made poor use of accounting techniques in the British industrial revolution, the paper shows that there was considerable sophistication in their application to specific purposes, including political lobbying and accounting for the accumulation of capital.
Introduction
The paper examines the use of accounting by entrepreneurs to resist the threat of regulation of working time in textile mills in the early 1830s, a period when public demand for restricting the working day to 10 hours, and for the protection of children in particular, reached its height. From the firm's point of view, regulation creates the risk of wealth transfers, or political costs, which it might rationally avoid through accounting manipulations, for example by reporting lower profits. 1 In the early nineteenth century, competitive pressures, ideologies such as laissez faire, or prevention of wealth transfers in favour of real wages at the expense of capital accumulation might have been motivated such manipulations. They might nonetheless assign irrational weights to the decision components, including the accounting elements, such as the determinants of profit and cost behaviour and the threat of wealth transfers at the expense of capital. For example if uncompetitive water mills were able to block legislation protecting workers they would prevent older mills exiting and perpetuate the stagnation of real wages. 2 The paper examines whether anti-regulation lobbying on working hours and child labour was characterised by accounting manipulation and gauges its influence. 2 The period of constant wages before 1850 in the midst of rising output per worker was referred to as 'Engel's pause' (Allen, 'Engels' pause').
complex partnerships and political lobbying. For these contexts, there is less evidence and less debate.
To investigate further, the paper uses archival evidence from the partnerships of Samuel Greg and his sons. Prior studies have mined this archive extensively. 10 Rose has written a history of the firm, the performance of its management, and examined its approach to labour management and the family's portfolio of investment activities. 11 Harley has examined the firm's profitability as part of a broader study, but only for the period of Samuel Greg's (1758 Greg's ( -1834 partnership with Peter Ewart (1767-1842) between 1796 and 1815. 12 Edwards's analysis focuses on the same period of Greg's activities, also commenting on the merchant partnership with James Lyle. 13 Rose refers to profitability for other periods and other parts of the Greg business structure, but presents actual data only for the period 1822-1832.
14 By taking a more comprehensive view of Greg's financial performance, the paper creates the basis for examining two hypotheses. First, that accounting demonstrated considerable sophistication in recording capital appropriations and accumulations. There were restrictions on the formation of joint stock companies under the Bubble Act, and partnerships widely used to raise and allocate capital 10 Held at Manchester Central Library, hereafter MCL. 11 Rose, Gregs of Quarry Bank, Rose, 'Social Policy and Business'; Rose, The Role of the Family'; Rose, 'Diversification of investment by the Greg family, 1800-1914.' 12 Harley, 'Was technological change in the early Industrial Revolution Schumpeterian?' Role of Ewart, see Musson, and Robinson, 'The Origins of Engineering'.
13 Edwards, thesis, 14 Rose Greg's of Quarry Bank, p.53. accumulations between partners according to differential shares contributions and successions. Accordingly, accounting might be expected to pay greater attention to appropriations and accumulations.
The second hypothesis assesses the consequences of reliance on child labour and long hours, particularly in rural mills, in an environment where regulators were unable to scrutinise factory accounts and financial records, 15 so that the possible financial consequences of regulation were subject to interpretation and possible distortion. To address this question, Robert Hyde Greg's 16 political evidence is compared to the actual performance of the business according to the accounts, to appraise the extent and consequences of any such distortions. The political lobbying example used in the paper centres on the Factories Inquiry Commission of 1833, which was concerned with the hours of labour in textile factories. To strengthen their arguments, opponents of regulation enlisted the support of Oxford economist, Nassau Senior. Senior argued that because profit was a specific fraction of total cost then it followed that all profit was earned in the last hour of the working day, and therefore any reduction of the working day would eliminate the profit. 17 Although flawed, Senior's arguments carried weight because, as noted above, the 'fixed cost' problem was poorly understood.
Senior's arguments show why the use of accounting in these debates was 
Accounting practices
An important determinant of accounting practice was the frequent changes in partnership arrangements. Some details of these are given in the prior literature, and in conjunction with these, the archive permits a fuller picture to be presented.
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A complete picture is important to better understand the series of accounting records, valuations and financial performance of different parts of the business. Frequent changes in partnership explain accounting practice. Archival evidence suggests the Greg accounts displayed considerable sophistication and indeed meticulous attention to the division of gain between partners. Double entry bookkeeping, rather than managerial accounting, was detailed and sufficient for this purpose. Indeed, the partnership accounts reveal a complex web of transactions and wealth transfers from one part of the business to another. 40 The main purpose of the bookkeeping was to account for Samuel Greg's accumulations of wealth. This is shown in the statements of assets and liabilities and a ledger showing the partnership balance sheets and Samuel Greg's account with the stock of the various partnerships. 41 Greg's sources of income from all sources are shown, with entries for rent, interest and profits, offset with amounts invested directly from his own account, including the cost of new machinery.
In the accounts of individual partnerships, the gain or loss was computed as the change in wealth arising from differences in asset valuations typically conducted at six monthly intervals. Such methods were used for the Greg A further effect of high rent and interest charges was to apparently reduce the accounting profit of the business. However, because rent and interest were effectively wealth appropriations within the partnership, it is appropriate to consider the profits of the business before these charges were deducted. On this basis, figure   2 compares the return on capital for the Quarry Bank mill portion of the Greg partnerships. 53 The exclusion of fixed capital from the accounts possibly explains the apparent tendency to out-perform the rest of the industry, insofar as the denominator in the ratio is made smaller by its exclusion. It may also explain the apparent volatility of the ratio. Even so, apart from the effects of the 1825 banking crisis, which were felt strongly by all firms in the industry, Quarry Bank appears to 51 MCL, Partnership books, C5/1/2-4. New machinery account, Partnership book, C5/1/2/3. 52 Rose, Gregs of Quarry Bank, p.52. 53 Return on capital is defined as profit per the partnership books of account (which the partners calculated as the difference between opening and closing values of net assets), plus appropriations of capital in the form of rents and interest divided by partners' total capital.
have been a profitable concern. The situation does not change when the fixed returns of Samuel Greg from rents and interest on fixed capital are factored.
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Because these charges were transferred to Samuel, the apparent net profit of the business was much lower in the accounts and as portrayed in figure 2. Robert Hyde
Greg's complaints were therefore based on his small share of the profit, not the actual profitability of Quarry Bank. It also provided the basis for a possible alternative story for the Factories Enquiry Commission.
Greg's evidence to the Factories Enquiry Commission
Greg's perspective on factory reform Greg and other objectors to the 10 hours bill also argued that Britain's advantage over continental competitors arose from the possession of better machinery so that more work was done in the same time with the same plant.
63
Restricting the hours of labour would therefore limit the advantage arising from more efficient technology. Specifically they argued that time for stopping and starting the mill would increase the proportion of unproductive to productive labour time and that restrictions on the time an individual was allowed to operate his machinery was an infringement of liberty.
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To add weight to these arguments, the campaign had the backing of Senior and his notion of the 'last hour'. Although the argument itself was incorrect, since reducing the working day would also eliminate cost in some proportion, the implied relationship was partially true insofar as some of the costs were fixed. Opponents of the bill therefore argued that reducing the working day would increase the burden of fixed charges. 65 Coupled with these arguments, objectors also believed that operatives' support for the measure was predicated on a belief that the same wages would be paid for shorter working time, and feared that these aspirations might be realised in part or in full. Further, they felt that restricting hours worked by children 63 In 1827 and 1828 wages were not disclosed separately and including contingency expenses. For these years wages were estimated using the proportion of wages to contingent expenses in the years 1829 to 1831.
A consistent argument made by the cotton factory masters in their evidence to the commission was that wages in their mills were higher than those paid by foreign competitors. Greg furnished additional evidence showing labour costs for mills in France, Switzerland, Prussia, Baden, Naples, and America, and Ashworth and Pooley, and Birley and Hoole used comparative figures from Ghent. According to their evidence wages were between 30-50% lower in the continental factories. On this basis they were able to argue that if a ten-hour bill were introduced, the lost production would all be captured by overseas competition. The unanimity of the masters on these points 77 is suggestive of collusion.
A point made repeatedly by opponents of restrictions on working time was that present profit levels meant that the implied increased unit labour costs could not be sustained. Assuming constant prices, Greg argued, if profits were also to be maintained, wages would require reducing by twenty to twenty five per cent. 78 It should be noted that the effect of presenting the figures in the final column of figure   3 instead of the 1831 figures per the accounts was to exaggerate the scale of this apparent wage cut. By presenting wages as a higher proportion of total cost, with other costs and profits held constant, the relative reduction in wages would be required to be larger.
Another important discrepancy arises when Greg's evidence on fixed charges is considered. He stated to the Commission that 'In coarse spinning the fixed charges and contingencies amount to as much as the wages; and if the former remained the same and price stationary, the reduction on the latter must be double.' 79 As can be seen from figure 3, if sundry expenses, depreciation, rent and interest, are all considered as fixed charges, then this claim appears true. To show the effect of high fixed charges, Greg used the following illustration: 'Supposing Lord Ashley's bill had been in operation the last year, we should have produced only 727,000 lbs at the expense of £12,730. We actually did produce £880,000 at an expense of £13,401
being a difference of 0.55d per lb, which is equal to a good profit.' 80 These figures imply the fraction of fixed to total expenses to equal c.71%, 81 and that a substantial proportion of wages were also fixed. They can also be contrasted with similar evidence given by Holland Hoole in Cowell's report. Hoole's figures showed that …the charge for rent, poor's (sic) rates and fixed salaries' accounted for 1.25d out of a total expenses of 5.5d, implying fixed costs to be 22.7% of total expenses. 82 Hoole's figures differ in part because they were based on a Manchester steam powered mill, which incurred variable expenses, such as coal costs. Even using these relatively conservative assumptions, Hoole was able to demonstrate that the loss in wages across the whole industry would be 'at least £1,000,000 per annum' on a loss of 79 BPP, Factories Inquiry Commission, 1833, ev Greg, p.782. 80 BPP, Factories Inquiry Commission, 1833, ev Greg, p.782. 81 Calculated using the implied leveraging effects of changes in cost relative to changes in output assuming constant margins. Greg's numbers suggest a 2.75% reduction in profit for a 1.00% reduction in output.
82 BPP, Factories Inquiry Commission, 1833, D1, ev. Hoole, pp.729-730. output 'at the disposal of our foreign competitors' of 40,000,000lbs. 83 In contrast, Greg suggestion that fixed charges were substantially higher seems implausible.
Charges for rent and interest were set by the partnership, and although the lower relative proportion to the accounts (figure 3) to some extent reflected the revaluation of assets in 1832, these were essentially appropriations of profit and can be discounted. Sundry expenses necessarily include some categories of variable cost, for example selling and distribution costs.
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A further important discrepancy between the two sets of data in figure 3 was the sudden appearance of depreciation. A possible reason for this was the 1831 dispute in the family referred to above concerning the value of the factory and machinery. A further possibility therefore is that the adoption of depreciation related to lobbying on 10 hours bill. The figures used by Greg stated that depreciation was £1,200 on a total capital sum of £26,000. 85 However, the figures are apparently inconsistent with the depreciation rates specified by Greg in the same minutes of evidence. He described the depreciation policy as 'five per cent annually on our buildings, water-wheel and engine and ten per cent annually on our smaller machinery', which covered 'not only wear and tear but also… deterioration arising out of new inventions.' 86 However, the actual depreciation charged was less than 5% of the asset value and therefore could not be the result of applying 5 and 10 per cent respectively to buildings and machinery. 87 Greg also refers to the use of a sinking fund, implying that depreciation was accumulated in a separate reserve rather than applied to reduce the balance sheet carrying value of the assets. Even so, when referring to the third mill (Lancaster) Greg's wording implied that he was using original cost minus the sinking fund.
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To examine the reasons for this apparent discrepancy, possible alternative valuations are shown in table 1. In addition to the value cited by Greg, the first alternative is based on a reconstruction of the value of the sinking fund, the original cost of the assets and the annual depreciation charge. The partnership accounts
show the carrying value of assets associated with the construction of the new mill, waterwheel and additions to machinery up to 1821 when they were transferred to the ownership of Samuel Greg. As the construction progressed between 1817 and 1821, these values were incremented by additional expenditure for that period.
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From these figures it can be ascertained that machinery was first deployed in the six months to September 1819 and increased thereafter until the mill itself was substantially completed in March 1821. Assuming a commencement date of March 1819, the value of the sinking fund, or accumulated depreciation D at time t can be computed as follows:
87 £1,200/£26,000 = 4.6%. Depending on the split between buildings and machinery the fraction by definition must fall between 5 and 10%, since under the reducing sum method the rate is applied to the book value of the assets. As figure 4 shows, Greg's evidence implied a rate of profit of just over 6 per cent. This was lower than all but one of the previous five years and 4% less than the five-year average. Although the rate of profit was not commented upon in the Greg's discussions before the committee, it nonetheless forms a useful piece of historical evidence, because it effectively shows the net effect of the differences between the partnership accounts and Greg's evidence. As the above review has suggested, the tendency throughout was to overstate costs and asset values, and the combined effects of these would be to reduce the declared rate of profit for the purposes of parliamentary scrutiny relative to the rates that were commercially achievable.
In the context of opposition to the ten hours movement, Greg had every incentive to understate the apparent rate of profit and yarn margins. Greg was also keen to discount the effects of increased efficiency from technical improvements, for example extensions to mule width, arguing that costs tend to rise in proportion. 
Figure 4: Quarry Bank Mill Return on capital, 1827-1833
Further, he argued that demand for cotton goods was elastic and that price rises could not therefore be passed onto consumers, suggesting that an increased price is attended by diminished consumption in a greater ratio than the rise of price. 101 In line with the points made about the cost base, these arguments stressing the fragility of profit helped Greg underpin his case, that the ten hours bill presented a serious threat to his business.
Conclusions
The accounting evidence submitted by Greg, Ashworth, Pooley, Birley and Hoole,
formed an important part of the case against the ten hours bill. When presenting their evidence they had incentives to exaggerate wages and other fixed costs and to understate apparent profitability. In Greg's case in particular, there were clear discrepancies between commercial reality and the evidence given to the commission. As the early part of the paper demonstrated, the Greg family made detailed and accurate use of accounting to appropriate profits between the various and relatively short-lived partnerships. Regular revaluation, rather than discretionary accrual was therefore the basis of accounting. The purpose of the financial evidence given to the commission was clearly different and provides an early example of accounting manipulation, or creative accounting, to achieve political objectives.
Greg's evidence, although influential was not universally accepted. Cowell was unconvinced and undertook his own analysis to show the fallacy of the arguments of the cotton masters. Puzzled by the apparent anomalies of relatively high labour cost and the rapid increase in investment in new capacity in Lancashire, he showed correctly and in detail that competitive success depended on unit labour costs, or 'payments for work done', as opposed to average money wages per employee. 102 Cowell's analysis showed that although cotton entrepreneurs were skilled manipulators of accounting evidence, they were poor economists. Greg's evidence nonetheless illustrated the ability of increasingly uncompetitive water powered, apprentice dependent mill owners to exert political influence.
Even so, it was the cotton masters and not Cowell, who had the decisive influence on the final Factory Act. The final commission report referred to the financial arguments of the entrepreneurs and coupled that with limited recommendations on child labour and inspection. Lord Althorp used the Commission report as the basis of a new bill, which was carried by a large majority, to the disappointment of Ashley and his followers, who were forced to surrender the original ten hours bill.
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Althorp would not have had the opportunity for this revision had not the masters lobbied for the commission that allowed their evidence to be heard. As the above analysis has demonstrated, accounting formed an important part of this evidence. Further research may shed light on similar practices as the regulatory framework of nineteenth century Britain evolved. The paper has shown the importance of accounting and provided an insight into how accounting was used by
